Sake Nation: “Japan’s Rice Crisis in the Reiwa Era: Challenges Facing Sake Rice Supply. Part 3”
By Kosuke Kuji
Continuing from the previous article, we discussed the serious problem of the severe shortage of sake rice in the wake of the Reiwa-era rice crisis. Of course, that was a major problem in itself. However, there was another problem that was even bigger.
That was the fact that even when we could get our hands on sake rice, its price had doubled.
Basically, sake rice production is planned in advance. By December of the year before planting, we meet with farmers and agricultural cooperatives to discuss how much sake rice we will need and determine how much should be planted.
This is what we call contract cultivation. Without such a contract, sake rice cannot simply be sold as table rice. Therefore, it is essential to carefully determine the required quantity before planting. Otherwise, if we end up with surplus rice, it can become a serious problem.
Of course, sake breweries purchase all the rice they have contracted for.
This was also the case during the Great East Japan Earthquake and the COVID-19 pandemic. During both periods, sake consumption dropped sharply, and we had to adjust our production volume. However, when it came to the rice we had contracted with farmers to purchase, our company bought every last grain without reducing the contracted amount by even a ippyo (a traditional unit of rice). Of course, we had stopped sake production, so this was an extremely difficult decision for us to make.
This time, even though we had contracts in place for the cultivation of sake rice, it is true that some farmers and agricultural cooperatives switched the planned production from sake rice to table rice, leaving us unable to secure the quantity we needed. But that was not the only problem. The price also skyrocketed, doubling from the price that had been quoted to us at the time the contracts were made.
From our perspective, we found ourselves in an unbelievable situation: we could not obtain the amount of sake rice we had requested, and the price had doubled. It made us question what the word “contract” actually meant. The impact was greater when we contracted with agricultural cooperatives than when we contracted directly with farmers.
That was the fact that even when we could get our hands on sake rice, its price had doubled.
Basically, sake rice production is planned in advance. By December of the year before planting, we meet with farmers and agricultural cooperatives to discuss how much sake rice we will need and determine how much should be planted.
This is what we call contract cultivation. Without such a contract, sake rice cannot simply be sold as table rice. Therefore, it is essential to carefully determine the required quantity before planting. Otherwise, if we end up with surplus rice, it can become a serious problem.
Of course, sake breweries purchase all the rice they have contracted for.
This was also the case during the Great East Japan Earthquake and the COVID-19 pandemic. During both periods, sake consumption dropped sharply, and we had to adjust our production volume. However, when it came to the rice we had contracted with farmers to purchase, our company bought every last grain without reducing the contracted amount by even a ippyo (a traditional unit of rice). Of course, we had stopped sake production, so this was an extremely difficult decision for us to make.
This time, even though we had contracts in place for the cultivation of sake rice, it is true that some farmers and agricultural cooperatives switched the planned production from sake rice to table rice, leaving us unable to secure the quantity we needed. But that was not the only problem. The price also skyrocketed, doubling from the price that had been quoted to us at the time the contracts were made.
From our perspective, we found ourselves in an unbelievable situation: we could not obtain the amount of sake rice we had requested, and the price had doubled. It made us question what the word “contract” actually meant. The impact was greater when we contracted with agricultural cooperatives than when we contracted directly with farmers.
To be continued in the next article.
酒豪大陸225「令和の米騒動から来る酒米の問題 その3」
前回の続きです。令和の米騒動を受けて、酒米が全く足りない問題を前回はお話ししました。もちろんそれも大問題だったのですが、もう1つもっと大きな問題がありました。
それは、酒米が手に入っても、値段が2倍に値上がりしてしまう、という問題です。
酒米は基本的に、作付けする前年の12月までにどのくらいの酒米が必要か、農家さんや農協と打ち合わせて、作付け量を決めます。
契約栽培、なのでこの契約がないと、酒米は食米にすることが出来ないので、量をしっかりと決めて作付けしないと余ったりしたら大変です。もちろん酒蔵は契約した酒米は全量買い取ります。これは東日本大震災の時もコロナの時も、日本酒の消費が一気に減り、製造量を調整しなければいけなかったのですが、農家さんと契約している米に関しては当社は一俵たりとも減らさずに全量買い取りました。もちろん酒造りはストップしましたので、相当大変な決断でした。
今回、この契約した栽培なのに、農家さんや農協側で酒米が食米に変更して作付けされてしまって量が確保できなかったのはその通りなのですが、値段も契約時に提示された値段から一気に2倍に膨れ上がりました。
私達からすると、酒米も希望数量いただけない、値段は倍になる、というとんでもない事になり、契約という言葉の意味がわからなくなってしまいました。これは農家さんと直接契約する場合よりも、農協と契約した場合のほうが影響が大きかったです。
次回に続きます。
それは、酒米が手に入っても、値段が2倍に値上がりしてしまう、という問題です。
酒米は基本的に、作付けする前年の12月までにどのくらいの酒米が必要か、農家さんや農協と打ち合わせて、作付け量を決めます。
契約栽培、なのでこの契約がないと、酒米は食米にすることが出来ないので、量をしっかりと決めて作付けしないと余ったりしたら大変です。もちろん酒蔵は契約した酒米は全量買い取ります。これは東日本大震災の時もコロナの時も、日本酒の消費が一気に減り、製造量を調整しなければいけなかったのですが、農家さんと契約している米に関しては当社は一俵たりとも減らさずに全量買い取りました。もちろん酒造りはストップしましたので、相当大変な決断でした。
今回、この契約した栽培なのに、農家さんや農協側で酒米が食米に変更して作付けされてしまって量が確保できなかったのはその通りなのですが、値段も契約時に提示された値段から一気に2倍に膨れ上がりました。
私達からすると、酒米も希望数量いただけない、値段は倍になる、というとんでもない事になり、契約という言葉の意味がわからなくなってしまいました。これは農家さんと直接契約する場合よりも、農協と契約した場合のほうが影響が大きかったです。
次回に続きます。

